Software is playing an increasingly important role in modern healthcare. Not every health app is a medical device. A calorie tracker isn’t. A step counter isn’t either. But that means to support diagnosis, monitor patients, analyse medical information, assist healthcare professionals in clinical decision-making, and control or influence medical devices. The deciding factor is the intended purpose, not the underlying technology stack.
IEC 62304 is the core lifecycle standard. It requires a software development plan, then structures development into defined processes: requirements analysis, architectural design, detailed design, unit implementation and verification, integration and integration testing, and system testing. The rigor applied at each step scales with the software safety classification (A, B, or C), which is anchored in the risk analysis rather than an independent probability judgment.
IEC 62304 also governs configuration management and problem resolution processes that continue through the rest of the lifecycle, and it explicitly requires controls around SOUP (Software Of Unknown Provenance), pre-existing components such as operating systems, drivers, or third-party libraries that were not developed under the same process rigor. Configuration management establishes and maintains the ability to identify exactly which version of the software is deployed, what components it consists of, and what has changed between releases.

Risk management should be integrated with software development rather than performed independently. IEC/TR 80002-1 provides guidance on applying ISO 14971 specifically to software. It addresses how software failure modes, use errors, and foreseeable misuse should be analyzed when the “harm” pathway is mediated by information rather than a direct physical mechanism.
New vulnerabilities get discovered years later, so security has to be built in from the start and maintained throughout the software’s life, not treated as a one-time check before release. Cybersecurity has become an important consideration for medical-device software.
Cybersecurity considerations may include:
Verification activities are performed to determine whether the developed software meets its specified requirements.
Depending on the software, verification activities may include:
Testing should provide documented evidence that the software functions as specified.
Technical testing alone does not necessarily establish the clinical suitability of medical-device software. Verification and validation demonstrate that the software performs as designed. They don’t independently demonstrate clinical benefit. Before and during market placement, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the software achieves its intended clinical purpose.
Clinical evaluation structure the evidence requirement into three components:
Once placed on the market, the lifecycle does not end. The software lifecycle continues after the device has been placed on the market. IEC 62304 maintenance and problem resolution processes, combined with MDR/IVDR post-market surveillance obligations, keep the software under continuous oversight.
Security vulnerabilities discovered post-release are evaluated against the software’s safety classification and its security lifecycle activities , then addressed through the maintenance process. Any modification, a bug fix, a new feature, a security patch re-triggers the relevant parts of the development and risk management processes, scaled to the significance of the change.
Manufacturers are expected to actively collect field performance data, track incidents and complaints, and identify patterns that pre-release testing couldn’t have surfaced given the scale of real-world use.
Findings from post-market surveillance feed directly back into maintenance, risk management, and cybersecurity review, keeping the lifecycle active rather than closed at launch.
The lifecycle of Software as a Medical Device involves much more than software coding and testing. It begins with establishing the intended purpose and determining whether the software qualifies as a medical device , while IEC 62304 provides a structured framework for medical-device software lifecycle processes. Throughout development, manufacturers need to consider software requirements, architecture, implementation, verification, risk management, clinical evaluation, technical documentation, cybersecurity, and regulatory requirements. After market release, the lifecycle continues through maintenance, software updates, change control and post-market surveillance. Therefore, successful medical-device software development requires both a controlled software engineering process and a regulatory framework that remains focused on safety, performance and the intended medical purpose throughout the software’s life.
Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) is software intended to perform a medical purpose such as diagnosis, monitoring, analysis, or supporting clinical decision-making without being part of a hardware medical device.
The intended purpose of the software is a key determining factor. Its intended medical function and claims are more important than the technology used to develop it.
IEC 62304 provides a framework for software lifecycle processes for medical-device software, including development, maintenance, configuration management, and problem resolution.
IEC 62304 defines software safety classes A, B, and C. The classification is determined based on the potential impact of software failure and the associated risk.
SOUP means Software of Unknown Provenance. It can include pre-existing software components such as operating systems, drivers, or third-party libraries that were not developed under the same medical-device software lifecycle process.
Recent Post
Assessment Timeline for Software-Related In Vitro Diagnostic Devices (IVDs)
Generative AI-Enabled Medical Devices: FDA’s Emerging Regulatory Considerations.
Are You Looking For Medical Devices Certifications?
Contact UsHave questions? We're here to help.
We'll respond shortly